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Economics of Swine Marketing Contracts
1. Introduction
The most recent survey on packer procurement and pricing methods done by Glenn Grimes
and Ron Plain (University of Missouri) for the National Pork Producers Council reports that
as of January 1999, 64 percent of market hogs were procured under non-spot market
conditions.  The spot market is defined as a negotiated price at the specific exchange time for
the hogs.  This level of contracting has raised issues of the economic performance of market
contracts as well as the legal aspects of market contracts.  Following is a general overview
of long-term contracts and their implications.  
2. Why Have Marketing Contracts Emerged?
A. Packer Motivations
(1) Supply Assurance
The hog industry exhibits large supply variability.  This is evidenced by the cyclical
nature of swine production as well as seasonal variation in production.  Large scale
U.S. packing plants face high short-term fixed costs.  These can include labor costs
as well as traditional overhead costs of facilities, depreciation, and interest.  In an
attempt to reduce exposure to the risk of supply shortages or capacity shortages,
packers have an incentive to coordinate supply via forward scheduling of hogs for
slaughter.  A means to accomplish this has been marketing contracts.  2
(2) Quality Assurance
An additional and related factor is the narrowing of demands of quality characteristics
for hogs.  So far, this quality distribution has been defined by the lean/fat
characteristics of hogs, but increasingly will focus on meat quality attributes such as
color, water holding capacity of pork products, taste and tenderness.  Requirements
that producers be PQA III certified is one manifestation of this desire. In an effort to
further insure quality specifications, packers have an incentive to pre-source hogs.
Particular quality specifications have the effect of narrowing the effective supply of
hogs to hogs which meet the particular standard, so packers try to “capture” this
particular supply through forward contracts.  Quantity and quality incentives are
closely related as the relevant market is defined by the quantity of hogs within a
specific quality type.
(3) Price Risk Shifting
Price variation has adverse effects on packer profitability just as it does for producers.
It can disrupt cash flows and credit acquisition or costs.  Hence, contracts may have
pricing mechanisms which seek to reduce price variation.  This can be beneficial for
both packers and producers, but may have the undesirable consequence of
disproportionately shifting risk from one party to the other.
(4) Regional Supply Changes
Investment in packing capacity is long-term.  The Midwest has traditionally had the
greatest share of packing capacity.  Since the late 1980's and continuing into the
1990's, hog supplies in the Midwest have declined while they have increased in the
Southeastern and Southwestern regions - outside the procurement range of most
Midwest packers.  Midwestern meat packers will often cite their desire to assist
producers in their region remain viable by offering risk protecting market contracts
which helped stimulate investment and reduced short-term cash flow risk exposure.
This strategy is in the self interest of packers to maintain supplies in regions where
they have large fixed investments.
B. Grower Motivations
(1) Price Risk Shifting
Since most contracts reduce market risk when compared with traditional marketing
alternatives, the growers= income tends to be more stable over time.  Of course, such
income stability may result in the grower losing some market flexibility and potential
for increased income.  Reduced market risk may also allow the grower greater access
to capital or preferred interest rates.
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(2) Market Assurance
Growers may face the risk of not having a buyer for delivery or more likely in
scheduling delivery times consistent with their production system.  The latter can be
particularly risky for growers with all-in-all-out production systems where delivery
is more likely dictated by time rather than market weights.  A market contract
provides assurance that a specified quality and quantity of hogs may be delivered at
scheduled times.
(3) Reduced Marketing Management
With multi-year marketing contracts, it is likely that time contributed to marketing
management will be reduced as compared to using other market risk management
strategies such as the futures market or short-term forward contracts.  This can free
time for production or other financial management activities which may have higher
returns.
3. What Are The Various Types of Marketing Contracts?
A. Futures Hedge 
Use of a futures hedge does not require the involvement of a packer.  In a simple hedge,
a hog producer would simply sell the lean hog futures contract nearest the date the hogs
are expected to be delivered.  This does not eliminate all future price risk as there is still
basis risk. Basis is the difference between the cash price and the futures price.  In general,
the net price received by the producer will be lower if the basis widens (the difference
between the cash and the futures price increases).  Using futures hedges does not address
market access issues, since it does not involve the packer.  In addition, producers must
be aware of the potential for margin calls if the futures price moves against their position
(in this case if the futures price rises).  In such a situation, the hedge is likely also locking
the producer out of profitable price increases.  Futures hedges should only be undertaken
with the aid of a trusted broker and with support of your lender.
B. Options Hedge 
The options hedge again involves the use of the futures market.  However, in this case
instead of selling the actual futures contract, the producer would buy the right to sell the
futures contract (lean hogs) at a certain price.  This would be a put option and the
purchase price of the put option is the premium.  Put options can be expensive, but the
main advantage is that they protect against price declines but do not limit the upside
potential if prices rise in the future.  In addition, the premium (plus brokerage
commissions) is all the put option will ever cost - there are no margin calls or other
financial requirements.  Again, market access is not addressed.4
C. Fixed Price 
These agreements determine the actual price hogs will be delivered in the future.
Typically, these will be very short-term e.g. 1-2 months because as the length of time to
delivery increases the risk of establishing a fixed price becomes greater.  The exchange
price offered is likely related to the futures market which allows the packer to hedge the
risk of fixing a price.  While this assures short-term plant access, it does little to assure
long-term access.
D. Fixed Basis 
As the name implies, the basis price is offered rather than the actual exchange price.  The
expectation is that the producer can then fix a price relative to the futures market plus or
minus the basis difference.  The producer may be given the option of never establishing
the price if delivery at the going market price is advantageous.  To utilize these
agreements, producers must have access to basis data to determine if the basis figures
offered are reasonable and acceptable.  Fixed basis contracts may be offered over the life
of futures contracts so they may extend slightly over a year.  Plant access is assured only
over the life of the agreement.
E. Formula Price 
Formula prices are used as a mechanism to establish prices when large quantities of hogs
are forward contracted with a packer and there is some concern about the ability to
establish a price.  The formula price is based off a “price determining market”: one where
there are enough buyers and sellers to effectively establish a price).  Formula prices for
example will be calculated as Iowa/S. Minnesota 47-49% lean hogs, plus or minus a price
differential or premium based on market differences such as location or overall quality of
hogs.  Formula prices do not provide price protection as they will fluctuate along with the
market they’re based on.  Formula pricing may or may not provide market access,
however, in most cases the formula price mechanism is a result of contracting for
quantities.
F. Cost-Plus 
This is a formula price based on feed costs which comprise the greatest single cost of
production.  However, this price is also used to set a minimum price level, so that it is a
risk protection contract in addition to quantity assurance and market access.  These
contracts may have a balancing clause where payments made to producers when market
prices are below the contract floor price must be paid back when the contract base price
exceeds the cost-plus formula price of the contract.  Lengths of these contracts range
from 4 to 7 years.  Terms and expected behavior of cost-plus contracts will be described
in more detail later.5
G. Price Window 
These contracts are very similar to the cost-plus contract other than the pricing
mechanism.  In general a ceiling and floor price are set.  When a predetermined market
hog price falls within the ceiling and the floor, the hogs are exchanged at the market price.
When the market price falls above the ceiling or below the floor price, the packer and
producer split the difference between the two prices.  Other terms are fairly similar.
H. Price Floor 
As implied by the terminology a price floor contract sets a minimum price.  To
compensate the packer for this protection, the producer places a portion of the hog price
above predetermined ceiling levels in an account to carry through the low price periods.
Hence, the producer draws on this account during low price periods.  The performance
of these contracts will resemble a long-term put option.
Of these contracting alternatives, the long-term packer-producer marketing agreements are
relatively new.  Futures markets and short-term forward pricing arrangements have a long
track record, and it is unlikely their use in itself results in changes in the fundamental behavior
of the pork market.  Therefore, the remainder of this paper will address issues raised by the
long-term marketing contracts.
Each contract is different, therefore, it is difficult to say which contract will perform the best
because it depends on the producer and packer situation.  However, the following illustration
of price performance is useful for illustrating the expected pricing behavior of long-term
contracts and raising issues related to their use.  These are not exact contract payments.
Assumptions about prices used, the time periods the contracts are in effect, and delivery
scheduling can dramatically affect the results, so all estimates should be viewed as
approximations.  
Cost-Plus Contract Illustration
In this sample cost-plus method, the hog price is based on a formula including corn and
soymeal prices plus a fixed payment, in this case $5/cwt.  The formula price sets a minimum
value paid, but if the market price of hogs is above the minimum price, the producer and the
packer split the difference.  Any carcass quality premiums are calculated in addition to the
cost-plus formula price.  In this particular case, the contract also includes a “ledger account.”
As the cost-plus price paid exceeds the market price, the difference is accounted for and
credited to the producer.  As the market price exceeds the cost-plus price, the difference is
credited to the packer.  Expectations are that over the term of the contract and with the
existence of hog cycles, the ledger account balance will be close to zero at the end of the 5-7
year contract term.  It is intended to be a “self-liquidating” loan.  In this particular contract,



























Cash Price Contract Price
Avg. Cash Price = $46.16/cwt.
Avg. Contract Price = $43.57/cwt.
Figure 1.  Long-Term Performance of Cost-Plus Contract
accrued on the account balance.  If either the packer or producer has a positive account
balance at the end of the contract term, the provision is that the contract may be extended or
the account balance can be repaid by the credited party.  In addition to pricing provisions,
market contracts will often include financial monitoring provisions, exclusive or right of first
refusal on all the producer’s hogs, quality specifications for hogs and possibly feeding and
genetics programs.  Figure 1 shows the price behavior assuming this contract were in place
over the long run, with the price simulation beginning in 1984 and continuing to March 1,
1999. As shown by the average prices, the difference over this 13 plus year period is only
$2.58/cwt.  This shows, why expectations over the long run would be for there to be only a
negligible ledger account.  Also, simply looking at the variability of the cash and the contract
price, it is clear that the contract smooths prices and reduces the likelihood of negative cash
flows for the producer.  The differences in prices can be thought of as the risk premium for
reducing risk.   Figure 2 shows the case where the contract was instigated January 1, 1995
and remains in effect until March 1, 1999.  This represents an approximation of the time
period many of the current contracts have been in effect.  The contract payout and the cash
payout are reversed from the longer-term illustration in Figure 1.  The cash payout over this
period is $2.26/cwt. lower than the contract payout.  In this particular contract, the difference
in payout will be maintained by the producer as a ledger account - it theoretically would be


























Cash Price Contract Price
Avg. Cash Price = $43.90/cwt.
Avg. Contract Price = $46.16/cwt.
Figure 2.  Cost-Plus Contract Performance, 1995 - March 1999.
Figure 3 shows the ledger account over the period 1995 - March 1, 1999.  The value of the
ledger account is in terms of dollars per hundred pounds sold in a particular week.  As of the
fourth quarter of 1997, the ledger account was zero.  The ledger began to increase rapidly as
hog markets collapsed in 1998 and into 1999.  The total amount will depend on the number
of head sold and the weight at which they are sold.  A producer who markets 100 head per
week would have a ledger balance of $703.25/cwt.* 2.5 cwt. * 100 head = $175,750.  The
way to interpret this level is to say “over the remaining term of the contract, the producer
price received under the contract must sum to $703.25/cwt. lower than the market price.”
To simplify, this is saying that the market price would need to be $2/cwt. higher than the
contracted price for 351 weeks for the ledger to be settled.  If the same average contract price
is assumed in the future (in other words crop prices remain relatively unchanged), market hog
prices would need to average $50/cwt. for 201 consecutive weeks (almost 4 years) for the


























Figure 3.  Cost-Plus Contract Ledger Account, 1995 - March 1999
Some contracts have specified credit limits, at which point the packer essentially begins
paying the market price for hogs or the producer begins to pay down the account.  The reason
for the limit is clear considering what can happen to the packer in this situation.  If a 12,000
head per day slaughter plant has 20 percent of their hogs contracted, then the amount the
packer has outstanding would be (assuming a 5 day slaughter) 12,000 head * 20% * 5 days
* $703.25/cwt. * cwt. =$21,037,500.  This illustrates how the volumes contracted by the
packer can quickly create a highly leveraged position for the plant.  This would not
necessarily mean the packer is unprofitable, depending on overall wholesale pork margins and
operating costs. However, it represents a lost opportunity for profits and likely harms their
relative competitiveness.  If history is an indication, these large ledger accounts will be self-
liquidating loans.  However, if underlying market conditions change, it raises the possibility
these loans will not self-liquidate.
Evolutionary Changes in Cost-Plus Contracts
Original cost-plus contracts were first observed in 1994.  Since that time, modifications have
emerged, both from within firms and across firms. Including interest costs on ledger accounts
was largely a feature of second generation contracts.  Similarly, as ledger accounts have


























Cash Price Old Contract New Contract
Avg. Cash Price = $43.90/cwt.
Avg. Old Contract Price = $46.16/cwt.
Avg. New Contract Price = $44.57/cwt.
Figure 4.  Illustration of Cost-Plus Contract Evolution.
operations and the payment terms have also been restructured. Figure 4 provides an
illustration of the payment terms of a descendent of the above contract.
In this case, the price paid under the new contract is lower than the original contract price.
This improves the chances that the ledger account will be recovered over the life of the new
contract.  However, it’s interesting to note that it is still above the recent historical cash
market hog price.  Producer’s under the old contract may or may not have the option to
renew under the new payment. 
Window Contract Illustration
The window pricing method relies solely on a hog market price rather than the cost matrix
to set its exchange price.  It sets an upper and lower bound (window) for the price and if the
market price is within the bounds, that’s the price at which the hogs are exchanged; if the
price is outside the bounds, the packer and producer split the difference between the nearest
bound and the market price.  In this case the upper price bound was $47/cwt. and the lower
price level was $41/cwt.  and there was no ledger account - the producer or packer simply
accepts the losses or gains.  Figure 5 shows the simulated results only for the 1995 through
March 1, 1999 period rather than historically.  For the period analyzed the market and


























Cash Price Contract Price
Avg. Cash Price = $43.90/cwt.
Avg. Contract Price = $44.59/cwt.
Figure 5.  Window Contract Illustration, 1995 - March 1999
much protection as does the cost-plus contract, but still mitigates some of the market price
fluctuations. 
Floor Price Contract Illustration
This particular contract sets a guaranteed floor price of $40/cwt. to be paid to the producer.
However, a producer must put $0.50/cwt. into an account with the packer when market
prices go above $45/cwt and must put $1/cwt. into an account with the packer when the
market price exceeds $48/cwt.  Thus, the packer is essentially maintaining a savings account
which the producer draws on when prices are low.  The balance in the account may be
positive in which case the packer owes the producer, or negative in which case the producer
owes the packer. The contract length is five years and is renewable if the balance remains.
Figure 6 illustrates the behavior of this contract over the period January 1995 through March
1999.  This contract has also paid out well relative to market conditions because of recently
very low hog prices.  However, recently the ledger account has turned negative (Figure 7) so
that the packer is essentially loaning money to the producer.  This situation is very similar to


























Cash Price Contract Price
Avg. Cash Price = $43.90/cwt.
Avg. Contract Price = $46.41/cwt.




























Figure 7.  Floor Contract Ledger Account, 1995 - March 199912
Summary of Long-Term Contract Performance
Although each of the long-term contracts is different in its mechanism, they all essentially
reduce price risk for producers.  With the ledger accounts, it’s clear that the intention is to
achieve a long-term price level near the market average.  However, in the short run there can
be significant risk shifting and balances accrued.  All market contracts closely track market
prices which means the main advantage is that they will amount to cash flow assistance —
smoothing out the highs and the lows of hog prices.  However, producers could achieve this
themselves through other mechanisms such as the futures market. It is clear that, from an
incentive standpoint, producers enter these contracts for market access considerations as well.
Contingencies of Long-Term Market Agreements
As part of assessing any contractual agreement it is useful to consider contingencies and how
they’re handled as part of the contract.  These “what if?” exercises are valuable for trying to
understand whether they are acceptable for the intended objective.  Following is a series of
brief considerations in long-term agreements.
What if the Packer’s Quality Premium Schedule Changes?  In the contracts reviewed, this
has no direct bearing on the actual base price performance of the contract.  Carcass quality
premiums are added to the contracted payout which is independent of the quality premium.
However, producers in Minnesota have several packers to choose from.  Since a producer
entering a contract is obligated to deliver hogs over the term of the contract, an unfavorable
quality premium change by the packer the producer contracts with would make it more
appealing to deliver to other packers who have not changed their quality premium.  So, by
locking in with a particular packer, it does limit the producer’s marketing options and ability
to make changes as appropriate.  
What if the Packer’s Base Price Changes?  This will directly affect the underlying price paid
under the contract and will also likely affect the value of the ledger account.  This possibility
is written into some of the contracts as an option of the packer.  However, in some cases, the
base price increased while the quality premium grid declined.  Hence, the net price received
may not have changed.  As in all circumstances it is very difficult to determine prices paid
without actually marketing hogs under alternative pricing systems.  Again, with captive
producers under contract, it limits their ability to market to other packers if these underlying
pricing elements change.  
What if the Packer or Producer Ceases Operations?  In most cases, the contract itself
provides for this eventuality and the contract is void.  It is not clear from the contracts
reviewed that the same circumstance holds for producers who cease operation.  In particular,
it is sometimes not clear what would happen if the producer had a disease outbreak and were
unable to deliver.  Although “Acts of God” will not incur liability, disease may be a special13
case because it is at least partially related to managerial practices and presents a moral hazard
problem.  That is, if the contract were not performing to a producers satisfaction, the
producer may be more careless about biosecurity and other health practices, resulting in or
contributing to a disease outbreak.  
What are the Implications of Large Ledger Accounts?  A commonly asked question recently
has been: “Aren’t these contracts hazardous because producers are accruing large debts to
packers?”  The immediate response is: “aren’t $20/cwt. hog prices equally as hazardous?”
There is no clear fundamental reason why the accounts themselves create any more problems
than the low prices they mitigate for producers.  The accounts are clearly a transfer from the
packer to the producer with the intention of settlement in the future and on a schedule that
coincides with high market prices. One concern is that packers may have the right to call in
the loans which does not appear to be the case.  The main problem is that packers may find
themselves overextended with relatively low quality loans in the sense that they may be
secured only by future hog production and not secured assets.  One contract had clauses
specifically addressing the need to collateralize the ledger accounts if the account became
large enough, but this was left to the discretion of the packer.  In extreme situations, packers
finding themselves overextended may find it necessary to renegotiate their contracts or risk
facing serious financial and competitive disadvantages.  From a producer’s perspective, the
prudent action is to treat the ledger balance as a liability, although the temptation is to assume
it will be paid back in the future on higher prices.  
What are specific delivery requirements?  Clearly the contract provides for access to a
particular packer.  However, it should also be very specific on delivery times (dates and times)
and delivery location.  Several packers own multiple plants and may attempt to schedule and
allocate pigs among the plants if warranted.  The contract should stipulate who pays freight,
shrink and other costs associated with delivering the hogs to a plant further away than the
primary plant specified in the contract.  Delivery times and dates are clearly important for
production systems utilizing all-in-all-out methods.  The contract should specify payment of
compensation if delivery dates are postponed either by the packer or producer.  
4. What are the Implications of Contracts on the Spot Market For Hogs?
A. Market Thinning 
On any given day, fewer hogs will be available on the open market when contracts exist.
If the market is competitive (there are no physical capacity constraints, there are still a
large number of buyers and sellers, all hogs (contracted and uncontracted) are essentially
the same), there would be little or no effect.  However, given market imperfections in
meat packing (few buyers, short-run capacity constraints, quality differentials in hogs,
high entry barriers) there is the possibility that spot prices will tend to be more variable.
Another aspect of market thinning or differential pricing is that since contracted hog14
prices have less flexibility, that packers will seek to purchase spot market hogs at a lower
price in order to lower the average cost of procurement. 
B. Quality Distribution Changes
One of the incentives for packers to contract is to secure supplies of high quality hogs.
Naturally, if the high quality hogs are contracted, the spot market will be comprised of the
remaining lower quality hogs.  In all likelihood, spot prices will reflect this lower quality
by being lower priced.  This is often observed when comparing the market for source
verified weaner pigs to feeder pigs sold in an auction market. 
C. Impacts on Contracts
If spot markets are compromised, this ultimately also has an effect on contracts since
contracts are often also formula priced based on spot market prices.  Hence, this can
become a circular problem -- more contracts to avoid less reliable spot prices further
erode spot prices which provides more incentives for contracting.
D. Integration
If both contracting and determining or discovering spot market prices become ineffectual
for meeting the objectives of packers and producers, an alternative option is integration,
where there is no external transaction price, but merely a transfer price within the
vertically aligned firm. It is highly unlikely that an entire market will become integrated
as the capital costs and management resources become extraordinary.  As we currently
observe, the market will likely be comprised of a mixture of spot market, contractual and
integrated procurement and ownership strategies.
II.
Legal Considerations in Swine Marketing Contracts
1. Introduction
Traditional agricultural financing is generally composed of three components: (i) long-term
credit to finance the purchase or improvement of real estate; (ii) intermediate-term credit to
finance the purchase of equipment and breeding livestock; and (iii) short-term production
credit to cover current operating costs, including annual crop production expenses.  However,
capital and labor are now frequently provided by different persons, especially in the pork
industry.15
Very often this is accomplished by contractual arrangements.  Such contracts may be either
(i) production contracts or (ii) marketing contracts.  It is important to distinguish between the
two types contracts.  A “production contract” is an agreement between a processor (or
contractor)  and a grower (or producer) that usually specifies in detail the production inputs
supplied by the processor, the quality and quantity of hogs to be delivered and the
compensation to be paid to the grower.  A “marketing contract” is an agreement between a
processor and a grower establishing an outlet and price, often based upon a formula for
determining the price, for the hogs to be delivered under the contract.
It is important to distinguish between production and marketing contracts in the pork industry
since they serve different functions.  Marketing contracts provide the packer with a stable
source of hogs at a price which is established by the contract.  Such contracts typically include
a delivery schedule and method for determining price.  They are often for a term of four to
seven years.  In contrast, hog production contracts are often used by large-scale growers
and/or processors to provide for specialized facilities and services for the purpose of feeding
and fattening hogs (e.g, farrowing contracts, nursery contracts and finishing contracts).  In
some cases, a grower under a marketing contract may be the contractor under a production
contract, providing management inputs as well as compensation for a grower which provides
such specialized facilities and services.
2. Basic Principles of Contract Law
Before one can begin to analyze the various risks presented by swine marketing contracts, it
is helpful to become familiar with several basic legal concepts relating to contracts in general.
Each contractual dispute involves unique contractual provisions as well as unique facts.  As
a result, any discussion of contract principles is necessarily very general.  However, several
basic principles of contract law are noteworthy.
A. Definition
Most business transactions involved contracts.  The Minnesota courts have never
provided a succinct definition of the term “contract.”  However, in practice, a contract
is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more persons which creates an
obligation to do or not to do a particular thing.  It is a promise or a set of promises for
the breach of which the law gives a remedy or for the performance of which the law
recognizes a duty.  Not all contracts must be in writing.  Conversely, the existence of a
written agreement does not necessarily mean a contract has been formed.  For example,
a written agreement, even though complete in its terms, does not become a binding
contract until the parties express an intention that it be so.16
B. Sources of Contract Law
The law governing contracts is found in several places.  Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code governs contracts for the sale of goods over $500.  In addition, the
Minnesota Agricultural Contracts Act will apply to such contracts.  Finally, apart from
those areas which are expressly governed by legislation, the Minnesota case law of
contracts will govern the creation, enforcement and interpretation of Minnesota contracts.
A swine marketing contract is a contract for the sale of goods which is governed by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.  As with the case of contracts in general,  the
provisions of the U.C.C. may generally be varied by the agreement of the parties.
However, should the agreement not address certain issues, the U.C.C. and the Minnesota
Agricultural Contracts Act will operate so as to supplement the contract between the
parties.  In addition, certain other provisions of federal or state law may affect the validity
of certain contractual provisions.
C. Freedom of Contract
Contracts may generally be made for any lawful purpose.  While a contract which violates
the law is “illegal,” the burden of establishing that a contract is illegal is on the party
making such an assertion.  Courts will generally construe contracts to be enforceable in
an effort to preserve each party’s freedom to enter into contracts of their choosing.  Thus,
the law presumes a contract to be valid.
D. Extent of Contractual Obligations
Each party to a contract is presumed to have knowledge of the terms and conditions of
a contract which he has signed.  As a result , a person cannot escape being bound by the
terms of a written contract merely by asserting that he did not read the contract.  In
contrast, if both parties to a contract make a material mistake which goes to the basic
assumptions behind the contract, the contract may be voidable by the party adversely
affected.  However, such a mistake must go to facts as they exist at the time of the
making of the contract.   
In interpreting a contract, the language used in the contract will usually be given its plain
and ordinary meaning.  A court asked to construe a contract will consider the contract as
a whole and will attempt to read all of the contractual provisions consistently.  The goal
of a court in such a case is to determine the parties’ intent.  Only if a contract is
ambiguous will a court consider evidence outside the contract itself. 
Some contracts or contractual provisions may be so one-sided as to be “unconscionable.”
In such a case, the contract or contractual provision may be disregarded by a court.17
However, should a contract be challenged as being unconscionable, a court will generally
consider the commercial setting and purpose of the contract in evaluating such a
challenge.  The mere fact the parties to the contract did not hold equal bargaining power
or that the contract was a preprinted form is not sufficient to render the contract
unconscionable. 
E. Implied Duty of Good Faith
Every contract includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing requiring that
one party not unjustifiably hinder the other party’s performance of the contract.  For
example, without an implied covenant of good faith, an agreement granting one party
complete discretion under a contract to terminate the contract would be illusory.  Under
the provisions of the U.C.C. governing the purchase and sale of goods, “good faith” in
the case of a merchant such as a packer means “honesty in fact and the observance of
reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.”
F. Changed Circumstances
Should some event occur which was not contemplated at the time the contract was made,
the affected party to a contract may be relieved from performance.  For example, if a
contract is made for the delivery of a specific crop to a buyer, the destruction of the crop
by hail before it is harvested may excuse the farmer from performing under the sales
contract.  However, should the market price for the crop increase significantly from the
date of the contract until the prescribed delivery date, the farmer will generally be required
to perform.  Mere changes in market prices, without more, will not allow a party to
escape performance of his contract.
G. Remedies for Breach
Should a party to a contract not perform, the other party to the contract may seek one of
several remedies.  Generally, a non-breaching party will be entitled to damages for the loss
resulting from the breach of the contract.  Sometimes contracts contain provisions which
predetermine the amount of damages to be recovered by a party in the event of a breach.
Such “liquidated damage” provisions will generally be recognized so long as the amount
is fixed and the damages are a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm
caused by the breaching party.  In addition, for such a provision to be enforceable, the
harm must of a kind which is difficult to estimate.  
Courts may, in certain circumstances, award remedies of specific performance or
injunctive relief in lieu of or in combination with money damages.  Specific performance
is an order by the court that a contract be fully performed according to its terms.
Injunctive relief usually consists of an order by the court forbidding one party from taking
certain actions that may be inconsistent with the contract.  Usually, these remedies are18
available only if money damages will not adequately compensate the non-breaching party
for the harm suffered. 
3. Legal Issues Raised by Swine Marketing Contracts
Several legal issues may be raised by swine marketing contracts.  As in the case of any
contract, the terms of the contract at issue will often be determinative in resolving any
contractual dispute.   However, there are several important considerations for sellers and their
lenders which are raised by such contracts.
A. Quantity of Livestock Subject to Contract
An initial issue to consider when assessing a long-term marketing contract is the quantity
of hogs which are to be subject to the contract.  Some contracts require specific numbers
of hogs to be provided each month or week.  Such contracts sometimes grant the buyer
a first option to purchase any additional marketable hogs produced by the seller.  Other
contracts involve a promise by the seller to sell all his production to the buyer.  
Contracts which cover all of the seller’s production result in an inability on the part of the
seller to sell marketable hogs on the spot market in the event market prices are in excess
of the contract price.  Conversely, however, if the contract price is substantially in excess
of the market price, such contracts provide the seller with a more attractive marketing
outlet for his production.  Under the U.C.C., a contract which provides for exclusive
dealing in the goods covered by a contract (such as in the case of a marketing contract
covering all of the seller’s hog production) requires both parties to perform the contract
in good faith.  Such contracts require the purchaser to use reasonable effort and due
diligence to utilize all of the seller’s production.  
B. Determination of Price 
A long-term marketing contract will typically set forth in some detail the manner of
computing the amount due the grower.  For example, some contracts establish the price
to be tied to a cost matrix based on costs of corn and soymeal.  Other contracts are based
upon a market price index.  
The U.C.C. recognizes that a contract can be legally enforceable even if the price term is
not fixed in the contract.  The law specifically allows a contract to establish the price term
by a future agreement between the seller and buyer or to be based upon a formula, market
or index.  So long as the buyer and seller intend to enter into a binding contract, the
agreement will be recognized even though the price is not firmly established at the time
the contract is signed.  If a contract provides the price is to be determined at a later date
by either the seller or the buyer, the U.C.C. provides that he must do so in good faith.19
In short, a grower should carefully review a marketing contract to ensure that he
understands the basis for payment set forth in the contract.  In addition to understanding
the formula, however, the grower should carefully evaluate whether the contract will
likely allow him to make a profit.
C. Conditions of Payment
A marketing contract will also generally establish various conditions of payment.  The
quantity of livestock required to be delivered as well as the grade, weight or condition of
the livestock to be provided under such a contract will often be carefully defined.
Compliance with the buyer’s nutritional and genetics program may be required.  The
contract may provide the buyer with access to the seller’s facilities to observe and verity
the seller’s compliance with such programs.
Premiums or merit adjustments may be provided for livestock which exceeds such
minimum requirements.  Generally such contracts provide that the determination of
quality is left to the buyer. Some contracts incorporate the standards to be employed by
the buyer in making such determinations into the contract.  Other contracts are silent with
respect to such terms.  Some contracts provide access to the buyer’s facilities by sellers
to observe and/or verify the buyer’s determination of quantity and quality of the livestock
delivered under the contract.  Absent a provision in a contract controlling such
determinations, the U.C.C. requires the buyer to act in good faith in making such
determinations.  
D. Amounts to Be Paid Seller 
Some swine marketing contracts provide for guaranteed minimum prices to be paid the
seller regardless of the market price of the hogs at the time of delivery.  While the details
of such contracts are unique, depending upon the terms of each such contract, there are
several common characteristics of such “ledger contracts.”
Such contracts generally establish a minimum price for the livestock.  The price paid the
seller may be greater than the minimum price if the “market price”of the livestock is
higher than the minimum price at the time of delivery.  The exact amount to be paid the
seller in such a case will be determined based upon a formula set forth in the contract. 
A portion of any amount by which the market price exceeds the minimum price may be
accounted for by crediting a reserve account established by the buyer for the seller.
Interest may, or may not, accrue on any such amounts owed the seller.  
However, if the market price for comparable livestock at the time of delivery is lower than
the minimum price, the seller will be paid the minimum price.  In such a case, the buyer
will account for such payments by debiting a reserve account in the name of the seller.
Any amounts owed the buyer by the seller on account of such payments may bear interest.20
Such amounts may be repaid when, and if, the market price for hogs again exceeds the
minimum price provided in the contract out of the excess via credits to the reserve
account.
Any amounts owed under such contracts, regardless of which party to the contract is
owed funds by the other, legally constitute an extension of credit to the other party. If the
seller owes the buyer substantial sums as a result of such a contract, it may affect the
ability of the seller to obtain continued financing from his lender.  Such amounts may
trigger defaults under the seller’s loan agreements.  In addition, some contracts provide
that the seller will provide the buyer with a security agreement granting the buyer a
security interest in the seller’s assets to secure all amounts owed the buyer by the seller.
If the seller grants a security interest in his assets to the buyer pursuant to such a
contractual provision, the legal relationship between the parties is transformed from that
of buyer and seller to that of borrower and secured lender.  Depending upon the
provisions of the security agreement, the buyer may obtain a security interest in the
seller’s machinery, equipment, crops and livestock.  
Conversely, if the buyer owes the seller pursuant to such a contract, the seller has
provided unsecured financing to the buyer.  In some cases, this may violate the terms and
conditions of the seller’s loan agreements.  In addition, the sellers remedies in the event
of nonpayment by the buyer will be affected by such contracts.  The seller will not be able
to reclaim any livestock which has been delivered to the buyer under such a contract
based upon the nonpayment of any amounts owed the buyer.  In addition, it is not clear
whether the trust provisions of PASA would apply to the nonpayment of any deferred
amounts owed a seller under a ledger contract.
Ultimately, of course, the balances owed under such contracts must be reconciled.  Under
some contracts, whichever party is in a negative position at the end of the initial term of
the marketing agreement may extend the contract in order to liquidate the negative
balance owed in the reserve account.  Other contracts provide that the amount owed in
the reserve account, regardless of which party is the obligor, is payable at the expiration
of the term of the agreement.  The manner in which any such reserve account is reconciled
should be carefully analyzed and understood by both parties to any such contract.
E. Nonpayment By Buyer 
As is true with any contract, a seller of livestock is always subject to the risk of
nonpayment or other nonperformance by the purchaser.  If the buyer breaches the
marketing contract, the terms of the contract may affect the seller=s remedies.  However,
both federal and state law may provide an unpaid seller of livestock additional remedies
in the case of such a default on the part of the buyer.  21
(1) Refuse to Deliver Additional Livestock
When a seller of goods learns that a buyer of goods is insolvent or fails to pay for
such livestock when required by the contract, the U.C.C. gives him the right to refuse
to deliver any additional goods except for cash and to stop delivery of any goods that
are in transit.  Thus, should a buyer fail to pay for livestock delivered, the seller may
be able to legally refuse to make future deliveries to the buyer.  Of course, in such a
case, the seller will have lost the benefits of a long-term marketing agreement.
(2) Terminate Contract
In addition to refusing to deliver additional livestock, a seller which has not been paid
may terminate the contract.  
(3) Reclaim Delivered Livestock 
The U.C.C. also gives an unpaid seller the right to reclaim recently delivered goods
for up to ten days after receipt of the goods.  Such rights may be subject to the rights
of a secured lender which holds a security interest in the buyer’s assets.  In addition,
should the livestock have been slaughtered prior to the seller asserting its rights, such
rights may be lost.  If a bankruptcy case is filed by the buyer during this period, the
Bankruptcy Code provides that the right of a seller to reclaim the goods may be
recognized.  However, the issues surrounding reclamation in bankruptcy become
substantially more complex.
(4) Seek Money Judgment
A unpaid seller may simply seek a money judgment against the buyer based upon the
terms of the contract.  In order to do so, the seller must begin a lawsuit against the
buyer.  Once a judgment is obtained, the seller may attempt to satisfy its judgment
from the assets of the buyer, subject to the claims of the buyer’s secured creditors
which will have priority over the unpaid seller.
(5) Assert Agricultural Producer’s Lien
Minnesota law may provide a seller with a lien on the livestock delivered to a buyer
under a marketing contract provided the seller takes the appropriate steps to perfect
such a lien.  The Minnesota agricultural producer’s lien grants an unpaid seller of
agricultural commodities, including livestock, with a lien against the commodities
delivered to a purchaser and the proceeds of such commodities for the contract price
of the commodities.  There are two major limitations on the use of this statutory lien.
In order to successfully assert such a lien, it will be necessary for the seller to perfect
the lien by filing a lien statement with the appropriate filing office within 20 days of22
delivery of the livestock to the buyer.  If a lien statement is timely filed, the lien will
have priority over all other liens in the commodities and their proceeds.  However, the
agricultural producer’s lien will not be available if the buyer obtained the commodities
free of all security interests and liens as provided by federal law.  Inasmuch as
livestock delivered under a long-term marketing agreement will, in all likelihood, be
free of such security interests, the agricultural producer’s lien may not provide unpaid
sellers substantial protection.
(6) Assert Statutory Trust Under PASA
A unpaid seller of livestock may be entitled to assert a secured claim based upon the
Packers and Stockyards Act (PASA).  PASA specifically creates a statutory trust for
the benefit of all unpaid cash sellers.  Under the trust provisions of PASA, an unpaid
cash seller is entitled to have its claim satisfied from a defaulting packer’s assets,
composed of the livestock purchased via cash sales, and all receivables and proceeds
from meat, meat products and livestock products.  If a packer has average annual
purchases which do not exceed $500,000, it is exempt from the trust provisions of the
Act.
Only unpaid cash sellers of livestock have standing to assert the PASA trust.  For
purposes of the trust provisions of PASA, a cash sale is any sale in which the seller
does not “expressly” extend credit to the buyer.   Nothing but an express agreement
in writing can operate as a waiver of the seller’s right to prompt payment for
livestock.
To preserve a trust claim against a packer, the unpaid cash seller must give notice to
the Secretary within 30 days of the final date for making payment or within 15
business days of being notified that the payment of a promptly presented check was
dishonored.  Failure to comply with the notice provisions will be fatal to a trust claim
under PASA.
Under the Act, a cash seller is entitled to “full payment” including the sales price,
prejudgment interest on the sales price from the date of delivery and costs incurred
in seeking to enforce their rights.  An unpaid seller who seeks to recover under the
PASA trust is not required to specifically trace or identify inventories or proceeds
attributable to his sale of livestock.  He need only show a balance due from the packer
and the existence of a floating pool of commingled inventories of livestock products,
accounts receivable and proceeds derived from cash and credit livestock sales.  If such
assets are transferred to a creditor of the packer, they may not lose their status as trust
assets.  Unpaid cash sellers will have priority over a secured creditor of a defaulting
packer. 23
Assets subject to a PASA trust are not property of the packer’s bankruptcy estate.
As a result, an unpaid livestock seller which has protected its trust claim may be
entitled to be satisfied from the buyer’s assets even if the buyer files bankruptcy.
F. Assignment of Marketing Contracts
In a time of consolidation in all industries, including agriculture, an important
consideration of any seller considering a long-term marketing contract is whether the
contract may be assigned by the buyer.  Generally, a contractual right can be assigned
unless the substitution of a new party to the contract would materially change the duty
of the party which owes an obligation to perform, materially increase the burden or risk
under the contract, or materially impair or reduce the value of the contract for the
nonassigning party.  In addition, the assignment of a contract may be precluded by the
contract.
As a result, long-term marketing contracts may contain provisions addressing the ability
of either party to assign the contract.  Some contracts provide that the contract may not
be assigned without the consent of the other party.  Other contracts prohibit an
assignment of the contract by the seller.  Still others attempt to restrict the ability of the
seller to transfer the facilities in which the livestock operations are conducted without also
assigning the marketing contract to the buyer of those facilities.
Should the livestock buyer merge or be acquired by another packer, an issue may arise
as to whether the surviving entity or purchaser will be required to perform under the
marketing contract.  Generally, if the assets of a company are sold, the buyer of the assets
will not be liable for any of the obligations of the seller, including executory contracts,
unless such obligations are expressly assumed by the buyer.  Thus, if a livestock buyers
sells its facilities and equipment to another livestock buyer, the new owner may not be
required to honor existing marketing agreements.  This may not be the case if a livestock
buyer merges with another livestock buyer.  In such a case, the obligations of the target
corporation may become the legal obligations of the acquiring corporation.
G. Confidentiality Agreements
Oftentimes, long-term marketing contracts contain provisions which prohibit the
disclosure of the terms of the contract, including the prices to be paid under the contract
by the buyer.  Generally, as with any other contractual term, the parties to a contract are
free to agree to such a provision.  However, on September 10, 1998, the United States
Department of Agriculture has issued a notice of rulemaking proposing that such
confidentiality agreements be made illegal under PASA.  In its notice, the USDA noted
that “conditioning the purchase or sale of livestock on nonreporting of prices may be an
unfair trade practice in violation of PASA.”  It is interesting to note that it is currently
illegal for a packer to disclose information to its competitors “for the purpose of24
restricting or limiting competition [or] manipulating livestock prices” to furnish
competitors information concerning “proposed” prices to be paid.
The 1999 Minnesota legislature passed an amendment to the Minnesota Packers and
Stockyards Act which requires packers to report daily all prices paid for livestock “under
contract” and through “cash market sales.”  Such reports must be filed with the
Minnesota Department of Agriculture (the “MDA”) and the USDA.  In addition to price
reporting, the Minnesota law requires packers who acquire livestock under contract to
provide the MDA with copies of each type of marketing agreement used by the packer
to obtain livestock from producers.
H. Buyer’s Bankruptcy
Should a buyer file bankruptcy, the rights and remedies of a seller under a long-term
marketing contract will be affected.  A marketing contract is an “executory contract”
under the Bankruptcy Code.  Characterization as an executory contract carries with it
several legal consequences.
Under the Bankruptcy Code, an executory contract may not be terminated or canceled
by the nondebtor party because of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.  As a result, even if a
buyer should file bankruptcy, the seller is not automatically relieved of its obligations to
deliver livestock under the marketing contract.  However, should the debtor have
defaulted in its performance of the marketing contract prior to filing bankruptcy, the
debtor will not be able to assume the contract without curing such defaults or providing
the seller with adequate assurances that it will be able to cure such defaults.  This means
the buyer may not be able to require the seller to continue to deliver livestock under the
terms of a marketing agreement over an extended period of time.
If a debtor has failed to make payments to a seller prior to filing bankruptcy, the claim of
the seller for such amounts will generally be an unsecured claim against the debtor unless
(i) the seller has preserved its PASA trust rights; (ii) perfected a statutory lien against the
livestock delivered to the debtor or (iii) promptly exercised its reclamation rights.
However, the claim arising out of the delivery of livestock to a buyer after the filing of
the bankruptcy case may be entitled to a higher priority in the debtor’s bankruptcy case
as an administrative expense.
Any executory contract to which a debtor is a party is subject to rejection by the debtor
or the debtor’s trustee in a bankruptcy case.  Rejection of an executory contract allows
a debtor to avoid performing under the contract.  For example, if a buyer entered into a
long-term marketing contract in which the price to be paid for livestock was substantially
in excess of the market price for such livestock, the debtor would be able to elect to not
perform under the contract.  Following rejection of the marketing contract by the debtor,
the seller will be entitled to an unsecured claim in the contractor=s bankruptcy case for25
the damage caused by the rejection of the contract. However, the seller will lose the
market for his livestock.
I. Termination of Contract
Virtually all long-term marketing contracts will contain provisions relating to the
termination of the contract.  A grower should always carefully consider the termination
provisions of a contract.  Generally, neither party will be allowed to terminate the contract
absent a default in the performance of the other party’s obligations under the contract.
However, contracts will often contain provisions which allow a party an opportunity to
cure any defaults under the contract and requiring the nonbreaching party to provide
notice of any such defaults before termination is effective.  It will generally be necessary
for the nonbreaching party to comply with such provisions to legally terminate the
agreement.  
J. Alternative Remedies
In addition to termination of the contract, marketing agreements may contain provisions
which allow the buyer to offset any claims which it may have against the seller against
amounts due the seller under the contract.  Such a provision is known as a “setoff”
provision.  Generally, the parties to a contract are entitled to such setoff rights (also
known as “recoupment”) even if the contract does not expressly so provide.  No court
action is required for a party to a contract to exercise such rights.  Nor is prior notice
generally required.  As a result, a seller which is dependent upon payments from a
contract to provide ongoing cash flow, such setoff remedies by the buyer pose potentially
significant problems.
K. Financing Considerations
A lender which provides production or facilities financing to a hog producer will likely be
very interested in the provisions of the producer’s long-term marketing contract.  If the
lender holds a security interest in the hogs, the buyer may acquire the hogs free of  the
lender’s security interest.  As a result, the lender’s true collateral for its loan will be the
obligations of the buyer to purchase the seller’s hogs.  Accordingly, a lender which is
considering the financing of a swine producer will carefully consider the financial strength
of the purchaser and the ability of the purchaser to utilize the seller’s production in
addition to the seller’s collateral in underwriting any such loan. In addition, the terms of
the marketing contract, including the setoff rights of the buyer, the payment terms, the
pricing formula, the ability of the buyer to alter the terms of the contract, and the risk of
poor feeding performance will all be critical to the lender.  Finally, any such lender may
require a collateral assignment of the marketing contract in order to obtain direct payment
of the proceeds of the contract from the buyer.26
L. Recovery of Capital Investment
The performance of long-term swine contract requires the grower to have specialized
facilities and equipment available for the production of the hogs which are the subject of
the contract.  Some marketing contracts require the buyer to approve the grower’s
facilities. Such facilities and equipment are expensive.  However, such facilities and
equipment must be available to the grower before the grower can contemplate entering
into a swine marketing contract.  And, should the grower plan to construct such facilities
in order to obtain a marketing contract, the grower’s lender may require a long-term
marketing contract before it agrees to finance a portion of the facilities and equipment
cost.
A critical consideration for a grower and his lender is the relationship between the length
of the marketing contract and the ability of the grower to provide for meaningful income
to service the indebtedness incurred in order to provide for such facilities and equipment
and to allow the grower to recover his investment.  The Minnesota Agricultural Contracts
Act attempts to address this potential problem for the grower.  Minn. Stat. § 17.92, subd.
1 provides as follows:
“A contractor must not terminate or cancel a contract that requires a producer of
agricultural commodities to make a capital investment in buildings or equipment that cost
$100,000 or more and have a useful life of five or more years until:
(1) the producer has been given written notice of the intention to terminate or cancel
the contract at least 180 days before the effective date of the termination or
cancellation or as provided in subdivision 3; and
(2) the producer has been reimbursed for damages incurred by an investment in
buildings or equipment that was made for the purpose of meeting minimum
requirements of the contract.”
Should the grower breach the marketing contract, the contractor is required to give
“written notice with all the reasons for the termination or cancellation at least 90 days
before termination or cancellation” and the grower is entitled to “correct the reasons
stated for termination or cancellation” within 60 days of receipt of the notice.  In the case
of “voluntary abandonment of the contract” or “conviction of the producer of an offense
directly related to the business conducted under the contract” the termination of a
regulated contract may be accomplished immediately.
 
While the purpose of the statute is clear, it may not provide the protection which it seeks
to offer.  Few, if any, marketing contracts expressly “require” the grower to make a
capital investment in facilities or equipment.  Rather, such contracts generally assume that
the grower has access to such facilities.  In such a case, the statute is not clear as to27
whether it provides any protection for a grower who already owns specialized facilities
or equipment prior to entering into the contract.
4. Regulation of Contracting 
A. Federal Regulation
(1) Packers and Stockyards Act (PASA)
The Packers and Stockyards Act is comprehensive federal regulatory statute for the
meatpacking industry.  In the words of the Congress, the purpose of the PASA is "to
assure fair competition and fair trade practices, to safeguard farmers and ranchers...to
protect consumers...and to protect members of the livestock, meat, and poultry
industries from unfair, deceptive, unjustly discriminatory and monopolistic
practices."PASA was prompted by Federal Trade Commission investigation into the
amount of control exercised by the Nation's five largest meat packing and livestock
and meat marketing firms and was enacted August 15, 1921 to assure effective
competition and integrity in the marketing of livestock, meat, and poultry.  PASA has
been updated several times to keep pace with changes in the industry. 
PASA provides payment protection for sellers of livestock by requiring prompt
payment, bonding, packer and poultry trusts, and market agency custodial accounts.
It addresses unlawful acts such as unfair, deceptive, discriminatory, or monopolistic
practices in the marketing of livestock, meat, and poultry.  Enforcement of PASA is
the responsibility of the administrator of the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards
Administration (“GIPSA”) of the USDA.
Those engaged in the business of marketing livestock, meat, and poultry in commerce
are subject to PASA.  Stockyards, commission firms, livestock auctions, order buyers,
dealers, meat packers, meat brokers, meat wholesalers, and distributors, and live
poultry dealers are included.  Farmers and ranchers are not subject to the P&S Act
when buying livestock for their own stocking or feeding purposes, or when marketing
their own livestock.
Several provisions of PASA address protection of the right of livestock sellers to
obtain payment for their production:
(a) Bonds
Commission firms, auction markets, dealers, and order buyers must maintain a
bond as a measure of protection for livestock sellers. The size of the bond is based
on the volume of business, generally an average two days' business with a28
minimum of $10,000 bond. Packers whose annual livestock purchases exceed
$500,000 are also required to be bonded. 
(b) Prompt Payment Rules
Commission firms, auction markets, dealers, order buyers, and packers are
required to pay promptly for livestock, usually by the close of business on the day
after transfer of possession. For livestock sold on a grade-and-yield basis, it is the
end of the next business day after the final purchase price is determined. Any
credit agreement must be in writing, with prior approval from the seller.  Live
poultry dealers must pay before the close of the next business day for live poultry
obtained in a cash sale.  Live poultry obtained under a poultry growing
arrangement must be paid for by the close of the 15
th day following the week in
which the poultry is slaughtered.  Payment for meat and meat food products must
be made according to contract terms.
(c) Custodial (Trust) Accounts
Commission firms and auction markets must maintain a separate bank account for
custodial funds.  This is a special trust account designed to ensure payment to
consignors.
(d) Packer and Poultry Trusts
As outlined above, if a meat packer fails to pay for livestock or a live poultry
dealer for live poultry, the receivables, inventories, and proceeds derived from
such purchases in cash sales or by poultry growing arrangement become trust
assets by operation of law. These assets are to be held by the meat packer or live
poultry dealer for the benefit of all unpaid cash sellers and/or poultry growers.
Such cash sellers and poultry growers will enjoy a priority payment position in
bankruptcy or in claims against trust assets in the event of a business failure.
(e) Solvency
Commission firms, auction markets, dealers, and order buyers must maintain a
solvent financial condition to remain in business. Insolvent packers may be
required to pay for livestock under specified conditions.
Livestock sellers have specific responsibilities to be eligible for protection under
PASA’s payment protection provisions. The requirements for asserting the PASA
trust are outlined above.   In order to assert a bond claim, the seller must file a written
claim with GIPSA within 60 days of the transaction in which he or she failed to
receive payment.  Persons who feel they have been financially harmed may file claims29
for reparations against stockyards operators, commission firms, auction markets,
dealers, and order buyers. To do so, injured parties must file a claim with GIPSA in
writing within 90 days of the transaction date, or in the case of fraud, within 90 days
of the date of discovery.  Once a claim is filed, an administrative proceeding will
determine the damages, if any, to be awarded the claimant.  However, there are no
reparation provisions against packers and live poultry dealers under the PASA.
In addition to providing for payment protection for cash sellers of livestock and
poultry, pursuant to PASA, GIPSA investigates and analyzes the structure and
performance of the livestock, meat, and poultry industries to ensure fair and open
competitive conditions.  Such investigations may relate to monopolies, apportioning
of trade territories or supplies, and the manipulation or control of prices, predatory
pricing, boycotting, and other restraints on competition, including pricing agreements,
agreements not to compete, and intimidation of potential competitors and conflicts
of interest.
Finally, GIPSA is charged with attempting to counter unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent
practices in the livestock and poultry industry.  Such practices may include
conspiracies; diversion of packer and poultry trusts; false weighing of livestock, meat,
and poultry and use of inaccurate scales; weight or price manipulations; bankruptcy
fraud; check kiting; and unfair business-getting tactics such as free trucking and
commission rebates.
GIPSA may enforce PASA through a variety of means including cease and desist
orders, suspension of business operations, civil penalties up to a maximum of $20,000
per violation for poultry payment and trust infractions and up to a maximum of
$10,000 per violation of all other infractions of PASA, and permanent injunctions,
fines, and jail sentences for actions taken through the Justice Department.
(2) Agricultural Fair Practices Act (“AFPA”)
The Agricultural Fair Practices Act is designed to protect the right of growers to join
associations of producers in order to enhance their bargaining power with purchasers
of agricultural commodities.  The statute prohibits Ahandlers@ (i.e., contractors)
from knowingly taking a variety of actions against individual growers or associations
of growers because of their membership in a growers association.  Under the AFPA
handlers cannot coerce producers to join or refrain from joining an association,
discriminate against producers who do join an association, or reward producers who
refuse to join an association.  However, the AFPA does not prohibit a contractor from
selecting its customers or suppliers for any reason other than a grower=s membership
or contract with a growers= association.  As a result, the AFPA has not been utilized
by many producers in litigation arising out of contract disputes with processors.
Several attempts have been made to strengthen the protection afforded producers30
under AFPA in recent years.  However, to date, such attempts have been
unsuccessful.
B. State Regulation
(1) Minnesota Corporate Farming Act
The Minnesota corporate farming act prohibits corporations or other business entities
other than family controlled entities from engaging in farming or owning agricultural
real property. The Minnesota law is similar to laws enacted in several other
Midwestern states.  Such statutes have been recognized as contributing to the
development of long-term marketing contracts and production contracts as a means
for purchasers of agricultural commodities to control production.  
(2) Minnesota Agricultural Contracts Act
The Minnesota Agricultural Contracts Act contains several provisions applicable to
Agricultural contracts:@
3 Any contract for an agricultural commodity must contain a provision calling for
either mediation or arbitration of any contract disputes.    
3 All agricultural contracts must be interpreted to include an implied statutory
promise of good faith.  If a court finds there has been a violation of the implied
promise of good faith, the court may allow the party to recover damages, costs
and attorney fees.
3 When a grower is Arequired@ to make a capital investment in buildings or
equipment that cost $100,000 or more and have a useful life of five or more years,
the contractor may not cancel or terminate the contract until (i) the grower has
been given written notice of termination at least 180 days prior to the termination
date and (ii) the grower has been reimbursed for damages incurred by such capital
investment.
3 If a grower breaches a production contract which required the specified capital
investment, the contractor must give the grower 90 days notice before terminating
the contract and must give the grower 60 days to cure the breach.
3 Parent companies of subsidiaries licensed to purchase agricultural commodities
are liable to a seller for any unpaid purchase price or any claim based upon a
contract if the contractor fails to perform.31
(3) Minnesota Packers & Stockyards Act
The Minnesota Packers and Stockyards Act (“MPASA”) provides limited payment
protection for unpaid sellers of livestock and disclosure of certain information by
packers, stockyard owners, market agencies and dealers.  Under MPASA each
regulated business is required to provide by MDA with an annual report disclosing its
maximum packing capacity and each contract the packer has entered into with a
livestock producer.  MPASA contains prompt payment rules and bank account rules
similar to PASA.  Should a packer not be able to fulfill its commitments under
contracts within 30 days of the delivery date, the MDA may seek to revoke or
suspend its license.  Finally, as noted above, a recent amendment to MPASA requires
daily and quarterly reporting of both contract and cash market prices as well as copies
of all agreements relating to the acquisition of livestock by packers.
(4) Minnesota Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act
The Minnesota Agricultural Marketing and Bargaining Act (“MAMBA”) is a state
counterpart to the AFPA.  The MAMBA covers producers of “agricultural
commodities” which is defined to include all “materials produced for but not limited
to use in or as food, feed, seed, or fiber, and includes but is not limited to crops for
fiber, food, oil seeds, seeds, livestock, livestock products, poultry, poultry products,
and other products or by-products of the farm products produced for the same or
similar use.” 
The statute sets forth requirements for accreditation of marketing associations.  Once
accredited, the association “shall act as exclusive sales agents for the bargaining unit
area in negotiations with handlers.”  
Under MAMBA, it is an unfair practice for a processor to: (i) coerce a producer in
the exercise of his right to join an association or to refrain from belonging to an
association; (ii) discriminate against a producer because of his membership in an
association; (iii) coerce or intimidate a producer to breach a membership agreement;
(iv) give anything of value as an inducement to producer for refusing to join or
terminating membership; (v) make or circulate unsubstantiated reports regarding an
association; and (vi) refuse to bargain with an association.  
At any time prior to 15 days before the first day of the marketing year in dispute,
either party may “opt out” of negotiations.  The processor may elect to not purchase
any commodities, directly or indirectly, from the association.  The association may
elect to not sell any commodities to processor.  32
The marketing year is set by rule to be February 2-February 1.  If either party makes
the  “opt out” election, the other party is not under an obligation to continue
bargaining with the electing party. 
The statute also sets forth procedures by which the Minnesota Department of
Agriculture can become involved to mediate contract negotiations and provides
detailed factors to be considered in mediation and bargaining.  
An issue may arise as to whether the AFPA preempts the MAMBA.  The United
States Supreme Court has held that certain provisions of a Michigan statute similar
to MAMBA was preempted by the AFPA.  Under the United States Constitution, if
a federal law and a state law conflict, the federal law will generally control.  This
general rule is subject to several limitations and qualifications.  The law surrounding
preemption is extremely complex.  However, if compliance with both the AFPA and
the MAMBA is possible, then it is likely that state law is not preempted.  On the other
hand, if compliance with both acts is not possible, the federal act will prevail.
(5) Minnesota Cooperative Act
Minnesota law contains special provisions which regulate marketing agreements
between a cooperative and its members or patrons.  Such provisions generally operate
to encourage the use of a cooperative by growers.  Among the provisions are the
following:
￿ Marketing agreements between a cooperative and its members may not exceed
a term of five years, but may be self-renewing, subject to the right of either party
to the agreement to terminate it at the end of the initial term.  
￿ Liquidated damages to be paid by the grower for breach of the marketing
agreement are made expressly enforceable.
￿ If there is a threatened breach of a marketing contract, the cooperative is
entitled to an injunction to prevent further breaches of the contract and to specific
performance of the contract.  In other words, the cooperative may obtain a court
order which directs the grower to perform under the marketing agreement.
￿ A person who induces or attempts to induce a cooperative member to breach
a marketing contract or who maliciously and knowingly spreads false reports
about the finances or management of a cooperative may be guilty of a
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Summary
Swine marketing contracts have emerged from a combination of incentives including a desire  to
better coordinate supplies between producers and packers, a desire to share or reduce price risk
exposure and an attempt to assure quality of supply prior to delivery.  Market contracts exhibit
elements of long-term price discovery as they evolve over time in response to changing market
conditions as well as performance of previous contracts.  
Producers seeking to enter contracts should carefully consider their motivations for entering contract
production.  If there motive is purely one of price risk protection, the futures market and options on
futures contracts offer an alternative to achieve price risk management objectives.   Alternatively, if
market access is of strategic importance, the long-term marketing contracts may be a more
appropriate option.  Currently, as more packers seek to either vertically integrate into swine
production or contract and pre-source hogs for slaughter, the issue of market access will become
greater.
Contract performance provisions will be as critical as the payout mechanisms in determining how well
the contract performs for any given circumstance.  Producers should always carefully read and
understand both the pricing structures to be used and other performance clauses.  In most cases,
contracts should be reviewed with an attorney and lender before a commitment is made.